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BLIND AMBITIONS & POLITICAL RHETORIC Why We Need A New Drug Strategy

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BY
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United States Army

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

**BLIND AMBITIONS & POLITICAL RHETORIC:
Why We Need A New Drug Strategy**



AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

**Mrs. Shelia R. Helm
United States Army**

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ABSTRACT

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When President Bush announced his drug war strategy on 5 September 1989, he promised a new and bold approach to curtailing illegal drug use in America. Though he allocated more funding for demand efforts, the four strategies were essentially the same as those of his predecessor. His 1992 Strategy proclaimed the drug war center of gravity as the drug traffickers' home base of operations. Mr. Bush expects to damage trafficking operations and cause a rise in street level prices for drugs. Higher prices, coupled with law enforcement pressures, are to drive consumers to treatment. Supply and demand tactics are numerous. With resources and manpower focused in several directions, it is impossible to effectively control any one area. If supply sources are damaged at all, treatment facilities have not been expanded to handle the expected influx of clients. It is therefore proposed that attention be centered on reducing demand. This paper give several solutions to reducing drug consumption, violence and the social ills which cause them.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite political rhetoric, public outrage and constant media coverage, the US drug problem continues. When Mr. Bush announced his drug war strategy, he ignored previous failures and opted to promise victory while deviating little from previous policies. In so doing, he proceeds in using a military analogy to solve a social problem, and like his predecessor, presses blindly down a path of defeat.

This is the first time since taking the oath of office that I felt an issue was so important, so threatening, that it warranted talking directly with you, the American people.

All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs. . . Drugs are sapping our strength as a nation. Our most serious problem is cocaine, and in particular, crack. . . Crack is turning our cities into battle zones. And it's murdering our children.¹

President Bush used these words during a nationally televised speech on 5 September 1989, to announce his drug war strategy. Citing a 1989 ABC poll, he added that the U.S. public felt drugs posed a serious threat to America. He identified those responsible as:

Everyone who uses drugs; everyone who sells drugs; and everyone who looks the other way.²

Though casual use of all drugs had declined between 1985 and 1988, habitual use of cocaine had doubled in 1989. By 1990, twenty-three million people used cocaine. Of this amount, 2.8 million reported they had used crack in their lifetime, one million

had used it in the past year and 662,000 had used it once a month or more.³ This increase, linked to crack use, provided the rationale for identifying crack as the most immediate drug problem.⁴

In fighting the war against drugs, Mr. Bush summoned national as well as federal support. From a national perspective, he called for help from schools, employers, communities and families. The federal weapons chosen were law and criminal justice systems, foreign policy and treatment and prevention programs. Though a two-front attack (demand and supply), the bulk of the effort and the preponderance of the federal budget center on supply reduction. By disrupting supply sources and tackling demand through state and local assistance, Mr. Bush expects to reduce US drug demand. The imbalance between supply and demand emphasis departed little from Mr. Reagan's anti-drug program.

When Mr. Reagan began his "zero tolerance" anti-drug program, he was responding to the violence associated with the drug world. His strategy was to hit cocaine supply sources from the growing fields to street distributions. The Reagan program emphasized interdicting drugs at our borders and arresting dealers, users and money-launderers. Though Mr. Bush's policies placed less emphasis on border interdictions, it retained the Reagan law enforcement features.⁵

All presidents who have waged drug wars have met their goals of increased arrest, incarcerations and drug and cash seizures. Yet, drug use, crime and violence continue. The public becomes more outraged and fearful because of the crime and violence, but

disinterested or intolerant of drug users. The media is responsible for arousing some of the public's fear.

"Turn of the evening news, or pick up the morning paper, and you'll see what some Americans know just by stepping out their front doors," said Mr. Bush.⁶ Within a few weeks of the President's speech, national TV news shows flooded homes with the crime and violence of the drug trade. Morris Jones (on City Under Siege), Ted Koppel (Nightline), Sam Donaldson (Prime Time), and Dan Rather (48 Hours) brought scenes of crime and violence week after week. Talk show hosts followed suit, as did the New York Times, the Washington Post, and Newsweek and Time magazines. Day after day, we watched the clear and present dangers of the drug business. We watched the capture of Noriega and the gory details of the Marion Barry arrest and trial.

Unfortunately, these displays were of young black and hispanic males. Thus, the U.S. drug problem has been transformed in the minds of many Americans as an inner city minority problem. As such, the American intolerance for drug use is being countered with severe law and order measures.

In this paper, I will look at the national drug strategy for controlling the use of crack cocaine. I will prove that we need to emphasize demand reduction efforts if we hope to curtail crack cocaine use. I will describe why I believe victory eludes us. Finally, I will propose a strategy by which we can reverse the trend of defeat.

II. LOOKING AT THE PROBLEM

There is general agreement that the US confronts an urgent drug problem. Most threatening is drug related violence. Vicious murders, innocent citizens caught between the crossfire of warring drug gangs or murdered because they oppose drug dealing have become daily events in major cities across the nation.

A second problem is the fear and demoralization caused by open drug markets. Citizens, public service workers and businesses relocate or fear to tread where drug dealers congregate to sell their wares. As neighborhoods yield to the drug culture, children are exposed to drugs and become involved by using and/or selling them.

As use increases, public health institutions and economic productivity are threatened. The spread of disease, unsafe sexual practices, serious accidents and low productivity result. Families are being destroyed, schools are less able to teach and the criminal justice systems is undermined.

Society's concern about the drug problem is entrenched in the way it is portrayed by the media and discussed in television and radio talk shows. More is being attributed to the drug problem than use alone causes. If drug use ceased, crime would not disappear, nor would fear, inner city decay or the AIDS epidemic. Yet, these alarming manifestations signal an important increase of drug use and provide the motivation for the nation to act swiftly.

The urgency of today's problem has been attributed to crack cocaine. Until the early 1980s, the price of cocaine remained high--well out of reach for casual use by poor urbanites or teenagers. Its use was confined to upper and middle class Americans who had begun using it in the late 1970s and became dependent on it by 1983. When bank accounts were emptied, tolerance of employers exhausted and support from families and friends withdrawn, the troubles of upper and middle class users became known to private and public institutions.

Crack, a cheap cocaine derivative, facilitated the spread of cocaine to poor and younger consumers. This spread led to new markets and increased violence among those exploiting these groups. Cocaine deals moved from hotels and houses in plush neighborhoods to inner city streets. Thus, many are led to believe that the drug scourge is an inner city problem. The media feeds the public psyche with displays of minority drug arrests leading most to believe that poor and minority groups constitute the preponderance of the problem.

Named for the crackling sound it makes when smoked, crack is made by mixing cocaine powder with baking soda and water, then cooking it for approximately twenty minutes. Baking soda, acting as a catalyst, removes the kerosene and other impurities used when converting the coca leaf to paste.⁷

Mr. Bush identified crack as the most serious drug threat confronting America. He attributed the overall increase in drug use and increased cocaine use to crack. A 1988 national survey

conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse estimated that there were 14.5 million drug users in America. This number declined to 12.9 million in 1990.⁸

The 1988 survey estimated that 5.8 million people used cocaine less than once a month and that 862,000 people were frequent or addictive users of cocaine. In 1990, the number of people using cocaine less than once a month was approximated at 4.1 million and the number of frequent users was estimated at 662,000. Some 2.8 million people were reported in the 1990 survey as using crack cocaine. Of this number, 1.2 million were white males, 252,000 hispanics and 710,000 were black.⁹

The 1988 Survey estimated that 5.8 million people used cocaine once a month or less. In 1990, this number decreased to 4.1 million, but increased to 4.5 million by 1991. Increased use by people age thirty-five and older was provided as explanation for the increase between 1990 and 1991. Frequent or addictive cocaine use (i.e., weekly or more frequent users) was estimated at 862,000 in 1988, 662,000 in 1990, and 855,000 in 1991.

III. THE U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

Before the introduction of crack cocaine in the mid-1980s, federal anti-drug policies were focused on reducing demand. Funding for demand reduction programs declined sharply during the Reagan Administration when the focus of U.S. policy shifted to law enforcement and border interdiction.¹⁰ The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act doubled federal spending for anti-drug programs from two billion dollars in 1986 to four billion dollars in 1988. About ninety percent of these funds were spent on reducing the supplies of illegal drugs to the US.¹¹ Instead of shifting government policy toward the origin of the problem--the demand for drugs--the Reagan program was committed to a law-and-order approach aimed at cutting off supplies.

Financial assistance was provided to Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, the major illicit coca producing countries, to assist them in efforts to reduce cocaine supplies. Program goals included manual eradication of the coca plant and destruction of laboratories and other facilities used for processing coca plants into cocaine. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 required the President to certify annually whether producing countries were cooperating in U.S. anti-drug efforts.

Additional features of the Reagan anti-drug program included the interdiction of drug imports at or near U.S. borders and domestic drug seizures on our streets. Efforts to seize drugs by

sea, land and air transports were aimed at reducing U.S. cocaine supplies. Domestic drug seizures, arrests of dealers and infiltration of money-laundering networks were undertaken to reduce drug use in America. Despite these efforts and increased funding, the Reagan drug war had little, if any, impact on U.S. cocaine consumption. Mounting public frustration and related criminal behavior and violence prompted Congress to pass more anti-drug laws.

The final piece of legislation signed by Mr. Reagan, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, required that more federal funds be allocated to combat illegal drug trade. This Act authorized an additional \$2.8 billion over the \$3.5 billion spent during the previous year. It also authorized judges to impose the death penalty in drug-related murders and stiffer penalties against occasional drug users, estimated to include twenty-three million Americans. Though maintaining a primary focus on supply reduction, this legislation called for spending approximately \$1.5 billion on drug treatment and prevention programs.

Despite his promise to defeat the American drug scourge, the Bush strategy departed little from that of Mr. Reagan's.

"We took a long, hard look at all that the federal government has done about drugs in the past--what's worked, and let's be honest, what hasn't."

"Our weapons in this strategy are: the law and criminal justice systems; our foreign policy; our treatment systems and our schools and drug prevention programs. So the basic weapons we need are the ones we already have. What's been lacking is a strategy to effectively use them."¹²

The Bush rhetoric promised new and effective action. He promised a bolder assault on drug trade and broader treatment and prevention funding. He also called for an escalation of supply side tactics, such as assisting producer nations in anti-drug programs and law enforcement efforts on U.S. streets. Though Mr. Bush placed less emphasis on border interdictions, he retained the focus on law enforcement to combat drug use. Not only did he retain the imbalance between supply and demand, he also called for greater law enforcement efforts to arrest and punish drug users and sellers.

National drug control strategies adopted by the Bush administration contain four major tactics in combatting illegal drug use in America. These tactics are law enforcement, international initiatives, drug treatment and drug prevention. While the first two attack illegal drug supply sources, the latter two tackle demand for illegal drugs. Though the primary intent of these strategies is to reduce illegal drug use, federal funding and anti-drug policies are geared toward law and order supply reduction efforts.

During the Reagan administration, ninety percent of anti-drug funds were spent on supply reduction efforts. Though the imbalance between supply and demand funding continues to decline, federal supply side tactics continue to receive the lion's share of anti-drug dollars. Mr. Bush's initial strategy for fiscal year 1990 allotted seventy-three percent for supply reduction efforts and twenty-seven percent for demand.¹³ Supply percentages for fiscal

years 1991 through 1993 were seventy-one, seventy and sixty-eight percent, respectively.

The rationale provided for this imbalance addressed three factors. The first was that many supply activities effect demand reduction. The arrest and punishment, for example, of a juvenile would deter drug use by his friends. The second factor is that supply expenditures are more costly than demand reduction efforts which rely on capital outlays, community involvement and individual commitment. The last is that supply reduction activities are government functions whereas most demand reduction efforts can and should be shared by schools, churches and communities.¹⁴

While these argument may have some validity, they are grounded in a premise that reduced supplies will lead to reduced consumption. This was the theme of the Reagan drug war strategy and it runs the gamut of strategies posed by the Bush administration. Despite his stated intent to curtail illegal drug use, Mr. Bush retains an emphasis on supply reduction reduction methods while illegal drug consumption remains undaunted.

Supply-Oriented Strategies

The four separate strategies for fiscal years 1990 through 1992 have changed very little from one to the other. In this section, I will address the latest one, specifically, and only refer to the others in pinpoint differences. The supply-oriented strategies are law enforcement and assisting major illicit drug producing countries in their fight against cocaine cartels. By attacking cocaine supply sources , the President expects to reduce

overall cocaine use by fifteen percent in 1992 and twenty-five and sixty-five percent by 1994 and 2002, respectively. He also expects to reduce by ten percent in 1994 and thirty-five percent in 2002, the number of people reporting that cocaine is easy to obtain.¹⁵ (emphasis added). The underlying assumptions are that law enforcement pressures will raise illicit drug prices and that arrests will deter casual and potential drug users. These, in turn, will lead to reduced consumption.

The major emphasis on disrupting cocaine supply sources to reduce demand is derived from an ill-defined center of gravity. The center of gravity is a military term which refers to the sources of strength or balance of an armed force. Clausewitz defined it as the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends. It is that component from which an organization obtains freedom of action, physical strength or the will to fight. If the center of gravity is damaged or destroyed, the organization is thrown off balance. Imbalance leads to a series of deteriorating actions leaving the organization vulnerable to further damage.

The center of gravity for the illicit drug trade has been defined as the drug traffickers' home base of operations.¹⁶ The President's strategy is to disrupt illicit drug trade and destroy the trafficking infrastructure by eradicating coca crops, interdicting shipments of precursor chemicals and cocaine, and prosecuting and punishing drug dealers and users. The ultimate goal is to reduce U.S. drug use.

Three of the five 1992 National Priorities are devoted to

reducing illicit drug supplies. These priorities focus on drug organizations, supply networks and street dealers. Reducing the supply of drugs is to be achieved by identifying principal organizations and developing and implementing plans to dismantle them. It also includes targeted efforts against drug trafficking transit networks and attacking market transactions at street dealer levels.

Focus on Organization

The focus on organization consists of three levels. The first is core organizations or those responsible for all phases of the drug business from production to distribution. A major component of this level is the U.S. international effort to assist major illicit cocaine producing countries in their fight against drug trafficking.

For purposes of this report, "Major illicit drug-producing countries," are defined as those "producing 500 metric tons or more of illicit coca during a fiscal year."¹⁷ Peru, Bolivia and Colombia meet this definition. It is in these countries where the bulk of cocaine reaching the United States is grown and processed.

Peru, the world's largest producer, and Bolivia, the second largest, account for sixty and thirty percent, respectively, of the cocaine shipped to the United States. Colombia, traditionally a major cocaine processing country, originates ten percent. Estimates in 1989 of coca leaf acreages in cultivation included 284,000 in the Huallaga River Valley of Peru; 133,00 in the Chapare River Valley in Bolivia; and 67,000 in Colombia.¹⁸

The Andean Strategy, named for the Andes mountains where these countries are located has four goals to stem the supply of illicit cocaine. These are to: (1) strengthen the political commitment and institutional capability of the governments of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia; (2) increase the effectiveness of law enforcement and military activities against the industry; (3) inflict significant damage on trafficking organizations by disrupting or dismantling operations and elements of greatest value to them; and (4) strengthen and diversify legitimate economies of these nations to enable them to overcome the destabilizing effects of eliminating cocaine, a major source of income.¹⁹

The second organizational level focuses on subsidiary trafficking organizations. These organizations are responsible for drug transports, money-laundering and drug distribution functions. Countermeasures involve halting illegal diversion of precursor chemicals used in drug processing, destroying clandestine labs, eradicating the crops and cutting off the traffickers' cash flow by stopping the laundering of cash proceeds from drug sales.

The third level targets money laundering operations. The focus of this effort is on improving intelligence capabilities, coordinating criminal investigations and prosecutions of suspected activities, achieving effective federal and state regulation and legislation and promoting international cooperation. The purpose of this element is to dismantle drug trafficking by seizing their assets.

This anti-drug priority--focus on organization--is centered on

Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. These countries produce the bulk of cocaine reaching America. Though subject to government control, coca production is legal in Peru and Bolivia and illegal in Colombia. Manufacturing coca derivatives, e.g. cocaine, is illegal in all three. U.S. demand and the culture and economic and political instability led to the growth of illicit cocaine production in these countries.

The coca bush has for millennia been known as the sacred plant of Andean society. In Bolivia, the coca leaf is indispensable to the Indian culture as a symbol for religious and secular events. Possessing great ritual, social and medical value, coca is also associated with agricultural work, with reciprocity between people and between mankind and supernatural forces.²⁰ Mass migration to the Chapare Valley where most of Bolivia's coca is grown and processed and a failing economy resulted in mass production of illicit coca crops.

During the 1980s, gross economic mismanagement, astronomical inflation and political instability exacerbated Bolivian economic conditions. The collapse of the London Metals Exchange, which traded in tin, and the 1986 slump in energy prices led this country into further economic decline.²¹

Bolivia's weak central government began with a 1952 revolution. Miners, labor unions, peasant farmers and segments of an urban middleclass banded together and defeated the tin oligarchy and the military. With a declining economy, this fragile state became powerless. Between 1982 and 1985, governmental conditions

allowed drug traffickers more autonomy. This greater autonomy and external demand for cocaine led to expansion and more power for the drug lords.

Bolivia's cocaine industry is dominated by twelve to twenty-five wealthy families. Their wealth originated from cattle ranching and commercial farming. Responding to US demand, these families rapidly shifted to farming coca. Peasant farmers working for them also made the change.

The astronomical profits made from illicit coca production led these families, in collusion with the military, to begin shipping large amounts of coca paste to Colombia. Officers of Bolivian military raided public funds to buy land for coca planting.²² Peasants and other workers receive higher salaries than that received from growing traditional licit crops. Over forty percent of Bolivia's economically active population depend upon the coca enterprise for survival.

Like Bolivia, coca in Peru was cultivated primarily by indigent Indians and played an important role in their culture. As a result of external demand and severe economic and political problems, illicit coca production grew. Peru, as a result, became the largest coca producing country in the world.

Poor management and a drain on Peru's foreign exchange reserves brought the country near bankruptcy in mid-1988. This forced the government to take severe actions that cut real wages in half. Factors leading to Peru's economic crisis included a sixteen billion-dollar foreign debt, four-digit inflation, accelerating

capital flight, low prices for petroleum and mineral exports, a shortage of new aid and investments and an inability to finance key imports.²³

Peru's current drug trade began in the remote Amazon area in the late 1960s, and expanded during the 1970s. Colombian intermediaries operating with Cubans in the United States were the key buyers. The business grew after Colombians started making their own sales directly to US buyers. Increased demand augmented by anti-drug efforts in the 1980s led Peru to increase productions and to establish processing laboratories to make coca paste.

Narco-dollars play such a key role in alleviating Peru's economic crisis that the government casts a blind eye on it. Major businesses and financial institutions are eager to obtain dollars no matter the source. Hence, these businesses welcome drug revenues.²⁴ The drug business also provides a source of income for the unemployed and the underemployed. Approximately fifteen percent of Peru's economically active population participate in the illegal drug trade. Peasant farmers earn twelve times more per month than earned from legal crops.

The merger of guerrilla forces, angry coca farmers and corrupted military pose extreme problems. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) guerrillas obtained entrance to the coca growing, Upper Huallaga Valley, on the coattails of the eradication program. This group convinced the Indian peasantry that the crop eradication was an example of government collusion with an imperialistic power, the US, designed to strip them of their

livelihoods.

The Indians, the country's coca cultivators, suffering from abuses by Colombian drug traffickers and governmental anti-narcotics raids, quickly aligned themselves with the guerrillas. The guerrillas offered them protection and better prices for their products. In exchange, they take a cut of the peasant coca crop and levy transit taxes on Colombian paste buyers.²⁵

In Colombia, few scattered Indian tribes chew coca. In the 1970s, responding to US demand, Colombians turned cocaine trade into a business. They consolidated lines of supply that reached from coca-growing Bolivia and Peru to their processing laboratories in Colombia.²⁶

Colombia's rise to prominence as the world's drug smuggling capital of the world began with a Cuban influence. Working with the U.S. Mafia, Cubans imported small amounts of cocaine from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia.²⁷ Colombians moved in on the business in the 1970s, and fought to control wholesale and retail cocaine distributions. Those objecting were killed. Geographical location, favorable terrain, strong entrepreneurial skills, and fellow Colombians in the US contribute to Colombia's development of the drug trade versus another country.²⁸

Coca paste is smuggled from Peru and Bolivia. It is converted to cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) in Colombia for export. The industry in this country has replaced farming, pasturing, mining and fishing. Peasants cannot make as much money performing these jobs as they can from the drug trade. Traditional Indian

communities and villages are transformed to drug zones. Hundreds of thousands of people in Colombia earn money from some aspect of the coca enterprise.²⁹

When not murdering themselves, traffickers intimidate, extort and murder private citizens, journalists, police, soldiers, judges, government officials and native Indians. Those who cannot be bought off or who are otherwise uncooperative are killed.

Focus on Supply Networks

The goal of the second priority is to interdict drug supplies by denying traffickers air, land and sea use and to intercept and seize drug transports at or near U.S. borders. The intent is to interdict operations of greatest value to drug traffickers. The primary targets are pilots, money managers and field managers who possess significant knowledge of trafficking organizations.

Mr. Bush placed less emphasis on interdiction than Mr. Reagan. The Bush desire was to reverse the trend of heavy reliance on interdiction efforts so that all parts of the illicit drug system could be addressed.³⁰ His budget proposal was to hold spending at the Reagan levels and spend more for money laundering and investigative activities.

Land, sea and air interdiction efforts are carried out in five phases. These phases are (1) detecting and monitoring targets; (2) sorting legitimate traffic from illegal transports; (3) intercepting smugglers; (4) searching smugglers; and (5) arresting them if it is determined that they have violated the law. As the

lead agency for the first phase, the Department of Defense (DOD) participates in the second phase--sorting legitimate traffic from illegal transports. DOD, however, is prohibited from conducting searches, seizures and arrests within the US and its territories.

Through unilateral and bilateral actions, this priority is aimed at disrupting and dismantling major transport operations. Through bilateral action, the US seeks to deny or interdict movement of drug and precursor chemicals in transit countries. These transit countries are Mexico, The Caribbean, Guatemala, Africa and other high-threat area countries along major transportation routes.³¹ Unilateral actions involve improving coordination of interagency activities. DOD, in consultation with other agencies, is charged with developing, testing and implementing enhancements to interdiction operations.

Focus on Street Dealers

The final supply-oriented objective is to limit retail drug sales by disrupting the drug market and raising stakes for users and dealers. Arrests and incarcerations are expected to cause raise drug prices, create purchase difficulties for consumers and deter potential sellers from joining the trade. Law enforcement presence and pressures are expected to reinforce and mobilize community groups opposing drug dealing and use. Investigations and prosecutions of street dealers are expected to produce information useful in attacking illicit drug organizations so that high level criminals are arrested.

This element contains two basic components. The first is

arresting dealers and deterring their replacements and the second is prosecuting and incarcerating dealers. Together, the two are supposed to disrupt drug services. This loss of service would create cash shortages that force major organizations into bankruptcy.

The investigation and arrest of street dealers is to be carried out by state and local law enforcement personnel, except in federal jurisdictions. The federal government contributes to state efforts by coordinating such anti-drug law enforcement information as which gangs operate in more than one state. Other contributions include lending expertise in specialized investigative techniques, information sharing and encouraging innovative approaches to remove drug dealers from streets. Accomplishment of these activities is dependent on community policing, multi-agency law enforcement approaches and state legislation. Community policing integrates police foot patrols with community interest groups to repel drug dealing, reclaim neighborhoods and deter potential customers and dealers. Forcing drug dealers to leave drug-infested areas and enacting anti-loitering ordinances to deter drug transactions and expansions to other areas are features of this effort.

While state and local governments conduct major efforts, federal assistance is provided to implement initiatives to remove violent criminals, eliminate drug activity from areas and preclude criminals from returning to an area. Federal grants, administered by the Justice Department are provided to states to assist in apprehending street dealers.

Coalition federal, state and local forces are to apply pressure at different points of the drug distribution network to unravel money laundering operations, remove illicit operations and clandestine labs from public lands, identify for deportation illegal aliens, pursue fugitives and track dangerous weapons. To reduce drug sales by gang members, a two prong approach--discouraging youths from joining gangs and dismantling existing gangs--is proposed and to be funded by federal grants.

A second objective of this element is to get states to develop or update criminal statutes to target problematic aspects of street drug dealing. The following have been identified as problematic aspects: the sale, use, manufacture and advertisement of drug paraphernalia; use of juveniles in the drug business; and criminal prosecutions of juveniles accused of serious drug offenses. The strategy seeks to convince states to adopt a drug paraphernalia act which subjects distributors to a period of incarceration. It calls for mandatory minimum sentences for adults employing juveniles in the drug trade and the use of adult criminal systems for repeat juvenile drug offenders, gang members and juveniles selling drugs within drug-free areas. Other legal recommendations include suspension or revocation of occupational licenses for professionals convicted of drug crimes and mandatory evictions from public housing communities.

The second component, prosecution and punishment, is meant to strengthen criminal justice systems so that arrestees are swiftly prosecuted and incarcerated for full terms. Factors weakening the

system are trial delays caused by personnel shortages and limited incarcerations because of insufficient prison facilities. To address these pitfalls, the strategy proposes hiring additional attorneys, judges and court personnel to handle cases expeditiously and the construction of new prisons to house the additional flow of inmates. Denial of state and federal benefits and urinalysis drug testing for drug offenders are other proposals.

Analysis of Supply-Side Strategies

Though 1992 priorities are titled differently from those in previous strategies, they are still the same. All four strategies emphasize federal responsibilities for supply reduction efforts. Yet, quantitative goals stress demand reduction. The dichotomy between areas of emphasis and measurements of success create difficulties in focusing on efforts producing the greatest benefit.

Anti-drug strategies in 1989-1991 listed the following as supply priorities: Criminal justice systems, international initiatives, border interdictions and security, intelligence and information management. The Research agenda initiative covers both supply and demand actions. These priorities and the focus on organization, supply networks and street dealers, as discussed above, are the same. The primary aim is to reduce cocaine supplies in America.

With the center of gravity identified as supply sources on foreign soil, it is reasonable that the majority of funding and

emphases be directed toward this effort. Funding and emphases have not only been directed at the traffickers' home base, but also at distributions points at U.S. borders and on U.S. streets. This requires that attacks be made on all distribution and production points simultaneously. Once control has been obtained, constant surveillance and enforcement presence on a long-term basis are required to retain it. Budget constraints, however will not permit this.

Anti-drug measurements of effectiveness are stated in quantitative two- and ten-year goals. These goals address demand reduction outcomes. General goals include reducing overall and adolescent drug use and high school senior attitudes on experimental and regular drug use. The cocaine specific goals are reducing occasional, frequent and adolescent use and availability amounts.

Progress toward reducing cocaine availability is measured in two categories. These are the number of high school students reporting that cocaine is easy to obtain and the amount of cocaine entering the US. The 1988 base-line figures from the national survey are used as comparisons for future years.

Increases or decreases in many of the categories cannot be tied directly to supply reduction efforts. The amount of cocaine reaching the US, though, can have an impact on the amounts available for consumption. The objective in the first strategy was to reduce the estimated amounts of cocaine entering the US by ten percent after two years (1992) and fifty percent after ten years

(2002).

Though the 1992 strategy retains drug availability as a high priority, progress on reducing the amounts of cocaine entering the US was not given. The rationale given was that estimates are imprecise and open to too many interpretations. The Office of National Drug Control Policy is to coordinate a study to determine a more precise method for estimating amounts of drugs entering the US and report on it in the 1993 strategy.

U.S. efforts to interdict shipments of drugs entering this country are intended to reduce supplies on U.S. streets. The result of this effort is to make drugs more expensive and difficult to obtain. It is expected that this will make treatment more attractive.³² When drug consumers realize that their search for drugs is too risky or challenging, they will turn to treatment. By making treatment more available and responsive, illegal drug use in America will diminish.

The major supply reduction themes have been essentially the same throughout the four Bush Anti-drug Strategies. These themes--increased international cooperation to disrupt and destroy international drug trafficking organizations; aggressive law enforcement to return control of streets to law-abiding citizens; and increased interdiction along U.S. borders to raise traffickers' business expenses--require an ability to control numerous fronts. U.S. ability to do this requires increased resources, national commitment and new legislation.

If we wish to bring about change in the international arena,

we must first take aggressive action against the debt in major cocaine producing countries. We must work with other nations to establish markets for licit crops. In turn, substantive incentives must be provided to induce governments of source supply countries to pass and enforce laws against drug trafficking. Inducements must be attractive enough to cause citizens of these countries to leave illicit drug employment for legitimate employment.

The U.S. crop substitution and certification programs are not economically viable options. The crop substitution program offers peasant farmers subsidies for cultivating licit crops. Incomes received are hardly enough to feed families. The salaries received from illicit coca crop production are greater than that offered through governmental programs. Thus, farmers have little incentive to give up the livelihood provided by illicit crop productions.

The U.S. certification program makes aid and trade benefits available to countries cooperating in U.S. anti-drug efforts. Countries not certified face penalties of losing half of their U.S. aid, trade sanctions and U.S. opposition to applications for loans from multi-lending institutions.³³ The President makes the final decision on countries to be certified. Congress scrutinizes certified countries annually to ensure their governments are implementing adequate and effective anti-narcotics programs. These measures are insulting and ignore the economic crises these countries face.

With prices for traditional commodities down, producer countries depend on cocaine exports to keep their economies afloat.

Cocaine dollars provide employment, supplement legitimate incomes, improve infrastructures, purchase businesses and build housing projects. Strikes against trafficking organizations leads to murders, assassinations and loss revenues.

Efforts to stem drug-related violence in U.S. streets must be met with stringent gun control laws and public willingness and commitment to control weapons by which dealers wield power and influence. Law enforcement personnel must be controlled to preclude overly aggressive action and corruption. U.S. citizens must be convinced that these efforts are necessary to stop violence on our streets.

Cash, drug and gun seizures have not reduced violence on U.S. streets. Despite captures of high and middle level illicit drug managers, replacements occur with ease. Mr. Bush contends that low level drug carriers are easily replaced and that apprehending them causes no lasting or significant damage to trafficking organizations.³⁴ The same appears to hold true for anyone working in trafficking organizations. Mr. Bush's contention ignores the crime and violence committed by street dealers.

Greater and more aggressive law enforcement measures overlooks the need to hold law enforcement personnel accountable for their actions. Police brutality cases in Los Angeles, New York, Chicago and the Washington Metropolitan Area are rising. More law enforcement turns a blind eye on the thought that U.S. law enforcement authorities can be corrupted by the illicit drug trade business. Obviously, Mr. Bush forgot or is unaware of the

corruption of the New York City Police Department when heroin use was at its peak.

U.S. borders must be fully patrolled to curtail any land, sea or aerial crossings. Presence at U.S. borders must be twenty-four hours daily and cover all areas. Sophisticated detection equipment is needed to spot planes, autos, ships or other drug transport means. Passengers and cargo on commercial and private transportation should be thoroughly searched to stop any drug arrival since shipment sizes and contents are difficult to detect by any other means.

There are numerous transshipment routes and unpatrolled U.S. and international borders. Traffickers use different modes for transporting drugs. Thus, the Bush claim that it is not necessary to blanket vast amounts of land, air and sea with interdiction efforts underestimates traffickers' abilities.³⁵ If drug trading was a static business, this claim might have some validity. Reports of expansions and innovative approaches to smuggling and transporting drugs indicates that it is not. To the contrary, drug trafficking is a dynamic and flourishing business.³⁶

When the above measures are implemented simultaneously, we will have gained control over illicit drug transports entering the country. Once control has been obtained, we must retain it through a long-term commitment of the aforementioned means. Then, we can expect some habitual user to seek treatment and some casual users to give up using drugs.

We do not have the resources to cover the myriad of fronts

described. Since we do not know if supply reduction strategies are yielding expected results, we must change our drug war tactics. We must focus on demand. By reducing demand, we can curtail supplies.

Demand-Oriented Strategies

Up to this point, I have not mentioned these strategies. However, if it is expected that reduced supplies will drive drug abusers to seek treatment, demand reduction strategies must be addressed. The treatment system, as will be seen, is not yet ready to handle an influx of clients seeking treatment.

The two 1992 demand reduction strategies are deterring new and casual drug use and freeing current addictive or habitual users. The first contains preventive measures geared toward the youth. The latter refers to treating drug-dependent victims.

Drug Prevention

Prevention seeks to deter individuals from experimenting with drugs and those using drugs on a casual basis. Heavy reliance is placed on community leaders, school officials and employers to portray the hazards of drug use and to hold users accountable for bad choices. The federal government provides limited financial support, technical assistance, leadership and information.

Training for judges and teachers to recognize and manage drug cases involving children is provided by the National Volunteer Training Center. Community partnership programs to counter street violence associated with open drug markets is funded through federal grants. Federal grants are provided to ensure the safety and development of children whose parents use drugs. Foster care, small family group homes and expeditious adoptions of abandoned infants are provided to place them in drug-free and

supportive environments.

Educational programs emphasizing illegalities and dangers of drug use are to be re-enforced with strong disciplinary actions. Qualifying schools are to receive federal grants to facilitate drug-free learning environments. Qualifying criteria is based on schools with severe drug and drug-related problems.

Legislative initiatives and law enforcement actions operate from the premise that law enforcement punishes and instructs. Policies directed toward users are expected to deter drug use by calling for clear consequences for those using and possessing drugs. Colleges and universities are to implement the Higher Education Act which contains anti-drug policies for employees and students. Drug prevention programs are to be monitored annually and corrective action taken if violations of federal requirements are found. States are asked to develop implementation plans that foster school, community and law enforcement collaboration to reduce drug availability and use among school aged children.

Work place prevention programs cover federal, state and private employment. Each federal agency is required to develop drug-free work environment plans, employee assistance programs, training and treatment referral plans. The Drug-Free Workplace Act requires contractors and grantees receiving over \$25,000 worth of government business to maintain drug-free work places.

The Administration encourages States to promote drug-free work places through enactments of drug-free work place laws similar to the federal laws. Legislation would subject employees holding

sensitive positions to drug testing and state-supported corporations to institute anti-drug places of employment.

Drug Treatment

If effective supply reduction methods are to drive drug users to treatment, then treatment must be available and effective. The second demand reduction priority--freeing current users--seeks to do this. The components are expanding treatment facilities, improving the quality of treatment, targeting hard-to-reach populations, treatment in criminal institutions and research and development. These programs are destined to get users off drugs and to keep them off.

Treatment capacity was to be expanded to treat from 1.7 million people in 1989 to 1.9 million in 1993.³⁷ This assumes that state, local and private financial support is not reduced below the 1989 level. Federal and state tax dollars are used to subsidize treatment for users who cannot afford treatment.

The largest federally funded effort is the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services (ADMS) block grant program.³⁸ New legislation has to been enacted to allow grants to be targeted to hard-to-reach populations (i.e., pregnant addicts, adolescents, prison inmates, the homeless or residents of public housing).³⁹ The strategy calls for categorial grant approaches to meet the needs of these populations.

Programs for addicted pregnant women are based on voluntary and coercive method. For those volunteer health and social service

resources are to be available and accessible. Anonymous tips on abusive mothers and coercion through criminal justice systems are methods proposed to get addicted mothers to treatment.

Fifty-percent of federal grant dollars matched with state funding is to be used for treating HIV-infected drug users. States are to be held accountable through state treatment plans in pursuing programs to reduce HIV infection resulting from drug use and drug-related behavior.

The strategy places high priority on adolescent inmates of criminal justice systems. Guidance and staff training in adolescent development issues and family therapy are to be included in the treatment process. Improved data collection procedures are to be developed so that adequate information is known and used when treating adolescent substance abusers. Medicaid funds are to be used to fund treatment for individuals who cannot pay.

To prevent States from using federal dollars to pay State expenditures, maintenance of effort legislation has been proposed. Since State funding for treatment is matched with federal dollar, the strategy proposes that States be policed to ensure they use federal dollars for intended purposes.

Expansion of treatment facilities are under proposal. These proposals link existing facilities, transitional housing and community development programs with drug treatment centers. States have been provided listings of underutilized military properties, proposed base closings and surplus federal properties for this purpose⁴⁰

States have the major responsibility for improving treatment effectiveness. Estimates of treatment needs at local levels are required to target resources to communities and populations most in need. Federal funding is provided for technical assistance in developing data on the incidence and prevalence of drug use and availability of services. Federal outcome and accrediting standards are intended to hold state treatment programs accountable for getting user off drugs and to identify criteria and measurable characteristics of predictive positive treatment.

Analysis of Demand-Side Strategies

These strategies are as broad in scope as those on the supply reduction side. Scarce state dollars are expected to reach segments of populations having other than drug problems. Many efforts are understudy, being researched or pending legislation.

The treatment priorities include inmates, the homeless, HIV-infected users, homes for infants of drug-abused mothers and other categories. It is unthinkable that any portions of this can work without adequate resources. If adequate resources were provided, problems associated with HIV and other diseases should be handled through this initiative.

Treatment centers have not been expanded. It is not likely that an influx of clients seeking treatment will obtain it. The use of medicaid funds, which are already stretched thin, to treat drug-dependent victims is an inappropriate means to fund treatment.

Research should have been developed long ago. The treatment and prevention priorities treat all drug use generally. These

assume that all drugs, no matter the type, can be handled the same way.

More effort and resources need to be devoted to demand side efforts. I contend that the center of gravity in the drug war is the consumer. Basic economics teaches that without demand (customers), businesses fail. The old rules of supply and demand apply to the drug trade as any other business. Businesses succeed because they provide the goods and services customers want and can afford. Drug barons have responded in every way to consumer demands.

Mr. Bush was correct in identifying drug users and sellers as those responsible for the drug scourge in the US. He was incorrect in developing the policies by which we are to fight this war. If we want to reduce crack consumption and the violence associated with it, we must be willing to focus on the causes for drug consumption and violence.

IV. TOWARD A NEW STRATEGY

If we are to succeed in this effort, we must refocus our attention. The attention must be aimed at reducing the demand for drugs. We must focus on the drug of most concern. Crack has been determined as the drug posing the most serious threat. Greater emphasis should be placed here with less emphasis on attacking all drugs.

The new anti-drug strategy spreads resources among supply and demand efforts. These efforts focus on reducing supplies and demand for cocaine, marijuana, heroin and alcohol. We cannot win an effort which forces our attention in so many directions.

Why People Smoke Crack

Drug traffickers do not conduct membership drives. Kids drift toward drugs or are lured to them by the profits. In many inner city areas, there are no programs for them to release aggressions.

Drugs and drug trafficking appeal to kids in low income inner-city neighborhoods beset by poverty, racial strife, broken families and meager job opportunities. The streets become more desirable than the crowded, rat-infested and poorly maintained public housing units many call home. With today's growing unemployment, few in these areas have jobs. They have no responsibility and nothing to do but stand on street corners and get into trouble. Without education, many attempt to show their prowess by taking and selling

drugs.

Poverty, alone, does not account for drug use. Cocaine use by the middle and upper classes has been around since the turn of the century. Entertainers and musicians used cocaine regularly. Recent statistics show that business managers, doctors and lawyers have also fallen prey to cocaine. Because of its cost, cocaine remained out of reach for the poor.

One reason for this group's attraction to cocaine is that many believe it is not addictive. Others use it simply to get high or to reduce stress. Its use among these groups is analogous to taking a drink after work. They are not the focus of the Bush and Reagan drug war policies. These were aimed at crack, an inexpensive cocaine derivative. As long as there is cocaine, there will be crack or some other derivative to support those who cannot afford cocaine.

Crack dealers draw the young from inner cities by their culture. Their attire, cars, gold chains, money and music attract those who want to share in the American dream. Peer pressure and threats are other methods used by dealers to entice youth to a life of drugs and crime.

Violence and Crime

American youth are committing an alarming share of the nation's crimes. The number of murders committed by youth eighteen and younger has been rising since 1985. After a steep decline in the early 1980s, murders by this group increased from 1,311 in 1985 to 2,555 in 1990.

The degree to which drug dependent youth commit crimes of violence is questionable. The public impression, fed by the media, is that crack users commit the preponderance of violence in America. Extensive news coverage of drive-by shootings, drug and gun seizures and arrests depict young black or hispanic males high on crack. The question of the degree drug abusers commit homicides has yet to be answered.

What Works

Arguments over whether law enforcement or social programs work best are endless. Social program proposals include preventing experimental use and individuals contemplating drug dealing, redirecting vulnerable populations toward positive activities and attempting to alter the socio-economic conditions that breed abuse and trafficking. These programs require assistance from the police, schools, businesses, social service agencies and community and political leaders.

Those advocating greater emphasis on law enforcement want longer incarcerations and the death penalty for those selling drugs or committing homicides. Law enforcement efforts have received new tools of power. Police have been given the authority to search suspects and raid homes without warrants. The legal probable cause element has been extended to allow this. New legislation also provides for automatic sentences for those dealing or possessing drugs within a thousand yards of school zones. Drug traffickers face the death penalty if their wares can be directly attributable to the death of a consumer.

A New Strategy Proposal

I recommend that a combination anti-drug efforts be focused more on reducing violence, drug use and drug dealing in this country. This strategy emphasizes deterrence and addresses the social ills which drive people to drugs. Some of these will require new resources while others demand a new focus to existing programs.

Since the public outrage and political rhetoric center on the violence of the drug world, part one of this proposal deals with this issue. The US has used deterrence as a tactic with forward presence for years. It has worked successfully in Europe, Korea and Japan. The idea is to deter enemy aggression. I recommend this same tactic be used against the illegal drug trade.

Deterrence Through Forward Presence

More anti-drug dollars should be provided to cities with the highest homicidal rates to build up law enforcement forces. These forces augmented with National Guard units should be stationed around the clock in known drug-infested neighborhoods. The presence of these forces will deter undesirable behavior. National guardsmen and law enforcement people were used in this manner to control riots during the 1960s.

Forward presence is used, in a sense, as a means to control traffic speeders. The sensible citizen who suspects a radar trap will slow down to avoid a traffic ticket. The "jump-out" approach to capturing drug dealers is also an example of this. Recurrent

use of this tactic by undercover agents has forced traffickers to deal in other areas.

Controlling expansions and police brutality are issues where forward presence can also deter action. Drug traffickers move to other areas when law enforcement efforts interfere with their trade. This holds true in American cities as it does in the Andean countries.

Their movement to other areas creates violence as they attempt to traffick in others' territories. Violence and expansion efforts can be impeded by citizen groups. Neighborhood watch programs are currently responsible for reporting suspicious behavior and crimes in progress in Virginia suburbs. These oftentimes result in arrest and convictions. Citizen groups walking the streets with walkie-talkies have also deterred drug trafficking and violence.

Who watches the cops? National guardsmen and citizens. Police are not likely to be overly or unnecessarily aggressive in their actions if they know someone is watching. There are enough cases to let them know someone is watching and that such behavior will not be tolerated. When caught, they should be prosecuted, thrown off police forces and put in jail with those they've abused.

And if we're really serious about stomping out deviant behavior, infrared radar detection equipment provided by the U.S. Army could be used by National Guardsmen to spot and photo drug deals. Photographs would provide the evidence needed to convict traffickers. Stricter gun control laws would keep guns out of the wrong hands. I propose that gunshops be state owned and operated

like American ABC stores. This is not too much to expect in light of the fact that we are at war.

These may appear to be drastic measures. Mr. Bush said that drugs were our gravest threats. He said publicly that they were the most serious threat to our national security. If this be true, then these measures are suitable for the situation. The question remains, what do we do with the drug dependent and the ills which breed drug use? These are best suitable for resolution through social programs.

Dealing With Abuse and Socio-Economic Issues

The only permanent solution to the drug scourge in this country is to reduce demand and the conditions which breed it. There is evidence that treatment programs work. They have succeeded in reducing drug use, improving behavior and enhancing the users' health and quality of life.

They are not panaceas in the sense that abusers will retain a zero tolerance for drugs; but, they do reduce use as long as the participant stays in the program. With many juveniles and first-time drug offenders being remanded to treatment centers, I propose that we increase use of coerced treatment to rid them of their desire to take drugs. Probation officers need to ensure that participants stay in these programs. When they fail to continue treatment, they should be remanded to prisons.

Our prison systems need to make drug treatment available for inmates. Inmates participating in these programs should be separated from non-participants. We should not, however, reward

participants with reduced sentences for displaying responsible behavior. They need to understand that positive behavior is a standard expectation for U.S. citizens.

While serving their terms, state and local governments should provide prison worker-trainee opportunities. Those meeting requirements, e.g., sustained progressive drug free lifestyles, would clean city streets, refurbish public housing facilities and other jobs which improve inner city areas. Once released, they are housed in these public facilities and employed by state and local social services programs.

This rids them of the responsibility of finding their own employment and the risk of returning to jail if they do not. Pre-established conditions of employment would require that individuals remain in these jobs for a specified period and that wages would be reduced to offset housing and previous prison costs. State and local employers should monitor progress and report positive and negative behaviors to probation officers.

Treatment opportunities should be available for all who seek it voluntarily. Fees for treatment should be based on the participant's ability to pay. Those receiving state subsidies should be coerced to seek and continue treatment. Their release from programs must be recommended by treatment officials. If they leave voluntarily, they should lose state and federal subsidies.

Information on the effectiveness of prevention programs has yet to be developed. However, it appears to me that they are viable substitutes for learning about drug abuse the hard way.

Prevention through education has been effective in altering public opinion on smoking and alcoholism.

Television ads on the hazards of smoking and alcohol abuse have reversed public acceptance of these habits. Non-smoking has become a way of life in America. The same holds true for alcoholism. Groups like Mothers' Against Drunk Drivers have served to reduce the number of traffic fatalities caused by alcohol.

V. CONCLUSION

In our ambition to reduce violence and drug use in America through supply reduction strategies, we have marched blindly down a road of defeat. Our insistence that coca producing countries destroy their crop so that we can save North America from the hazards of drug use and abuse is nonsense. We need to take responsibility for those situations which lend themselves to drug use and focus our attention on demand reduction efforts.

We cannot and should not give up our efforts to reduce demand because we have adopted the wrong policies. We need to change to those strategies to emphasize demand reduction. We cannot be timid, however, in the approaches we use. If this is war and not political rhetoric, we need to employ the strengths in our society to combat this disease.

These efforts will be expensive. The benefits derived will abound in relation to those costs if we take the challenges before us seriously. All segments of society must get involved if we wish to stamp out this scourge.

We cannot wish this scourge away. We cannot admit defeat and choose to legalize drugs. Neither can we allow our cities to continue to decay. The freedoms and liberties for which we have fought and that we value can no longer be used to rationalize destructive behaviors.

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